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Commentary
Peter N. Ireland
tion policy aims at keeping the economy at or near
the good steady state.
Stabilization policy in this analysis therefore
plays an important but somewhat unfamiliar role.
Typically, in mainstream macroeconomic models,
stabilization policy calls for the monetary and
fiscal authorities to adjust their policy instruments
in response to shocks that buffet the economy
around a given steady state. In Antinolfi, Azariadis,
and Bullard’s model, by contrast, stabilization
policy works on a more fundamental level, to
actually pick out the steady state toward which
the economy gravitates. Hence their paper’s title,
“Monetary Policy as Equilibrium Selection.”
Here, monetary policy helps achieve this sta-
bilization goal by reversing the properties of the
two steady states, rendering the good steady state
stable and the bad steady state unstable.
Specifically, the authors show that active
policies that call for the government to adjust its
policy instruments vigorously in response to
changes in the underlying state of the economy
succeed in achieving this goal. By contrast, pas-
sive policies—including constant money growth
rate rules—that call for little or no policy response
to changes in the economy fail by leaving the
bad steady state as the economy’s most likely
destination.
Antinolfi, Azariadis, and Bullard’s analysis,
results, and conclusions combine to make their
paper quite interesting and useful. The paper is
novel in its focus on active versus passive policy
rules in models of the type used in Bewley (1980)
and Townsend (1980). Ljungqvist and Sargent
I
n their conference paper, Gaetano Antinolfi,
Costas Azariadis, and James Bullard (2007)
develop and analyze a macroeconomic
model with heterogeneous agents in which
individual incomes fluctuate, aggregate income
remains constant, and frictions that inhibit the
strict enforcement of private contracts place
endogenous limits on agents’ ability to borrow
and lend and hence to engage in intertemporal
trade. Further, because the model features only
a single good, intertemporal trade is the only
trade that potentially takes place in equilibrium.
Bewley (1980), Townsend (1980), Kehoe and
Levine (1993), Kocherlakota (1996), and Alvarez
and Jermann (2000) previously and famously
considered similar models. Here, however,
Antinolfi, Azariadis, and Bullard go beyond all
of this previous work by highlighting that these
models typically feature multiple equilibria.
Here, in fact, the authors’ model has two
steady-state equilibria under laissez-faire. In one,
no trade takes place, so that equilibrium alloca-
tions are autarkic; in the other, agents trade
actively. Hence, the two steady states can be
Pareto-ranked: All agents prefer the good equilib-
rium with trade to the bad equilibrium without.
The authors’ policy problem then arises, because
the bad steady state is stable and the good steady
state is unstable, implying that even if the econ-
omy begins arbitrarily close to but not exactly in
the good steady state, it will converge over time
to the bad steady state. In Antinolfi, Azariadis,
and Bullard’s analysis, the government’s stabiliza-
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approach to policy analysis in a version of
Townsend’s (1980) turnpike model. Specifically,
Ljungqvist and Sargent simply assume that the
economy starts in its good steady state and then
ask what the optimal constant rate of money
growth in that good steady state is. Antinolfi,
Azariadis, and Bullard qualify and extend these
earlier results in an important way by making
clear that Ljungqvist and Sargent’s preferred con-
stant money growth rate rule does not prevent
the economy from leaving a neighborhood of its
good steady state and converging to the bad
steady state instead.
By highlighting the importance of this active-
versus-passive distinction for the design of
welfare-enhancing monetary policy, Antinolfi,
Azariadis, and Bullard’s paper also becomes quite
useful, as it draws previously unnoticed links
between the branch of the literature that works
with Bewley-Townsend-type models and another
branch of the literature in monetary economics
that works with a very different class of models.
In particular, recent work with New Keynesian
models featuring monopolistic competition and
staggered nominal price setting in goods markets
establishes what Woodford (2003) and others call
the “Taylor principle.” This Taylor principle indi-
cates that the central bank can stabilize the infla-
tion rate around a desired target value through the
use of an interest rate rule for monetary policy of
the kind proposed by Taylor (1993), provided that
rule is sufficiently active, calling for a vigorous
adjustment of the short-term nominal interest
rate instrument in response to shocks that push
the inflation rate away from target. Antinolfi,
Azariadis, and Bullard’s results favor the use of
active monetary policy rules as well, helping to
establish the generality and robustness of these
findings across two otherwise divergent branches
of inquiry.
This new paper by Antinolfi, Azariadis, and
Bullard thereby contributes importantly to the
literature. It extends, as the other conference
papers do, the “Frontiers in Monetary Policy
Research.” What’s more, like many other papers
that extend the frontiers of research—particularly
in monetary economics, it seems—this new paper
raises a host of additional questions at the same
time that it provides answers to existing ones.
The remainder of my discussion focuses on
some of these additional questions, pointing as
Antinolfi, Azariadis, and Bullard’s paper itself
does to promising avenues for future research.
IS PUBLIC POLICY REALLY
NECESSARY?
This first and most basic question asks
whether public policy is really crucial in an
economic environment like the one described by
Antinolfi, Azariadis, and Bullard’s model. In their
paper, the authors themselves provide a partial
response to this question by indicating that the
answer is “no” if private credit markets work well
to begin with. In particular, the authors show that,
when contracts can be perfectly enforced, trading
in private credit markets supports an equilibrium
allocation that is Pareto optimal. In this special
case, government policy cannot help; laissez-faire
works best.
Yet one might go a step further, as I am
tempted to do, and note that even with limited
contractual enforcement, the scope for welfare-
enhancing public policy, though present, will
necessarily be limited to the extent that the
autarkic equilibrium is really not so bad. I raise
this possibility with a specific concern in mind.
The point is that all of these terms—“bad equilib-
rium,” “autarkic allocations,” “unstable steady
states,” and so on—have very specific meanings
when used in the context of a formal study in
macroeconomic theory like Antinolfi, Azariadis,
and Bullard’s. Of course, the authors very care-
fully and properly use these terms in their paper.
However, the risk remains that, when presented
to a broader audience of nonspecialists and policy-
makers, these words will unintentionally conjure
up images of disastrous outcomes under laissez-
faire; in fact, though, a full, quantitative assess-
ment of the welfare properties of equilibrium
outcomes with and without government inter-
vention—perhaps along the same lines as that
presented by Krueger and Perri (2005) but applied
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a task for future research.
In his famous essay “The Role of Monetary
Policy,” Milton Friedman (1968, p. 14) cautions
against the tendency toward overconfidence in
economists offering policy advice: “[I]n this area
particularly,” he warns, “the best is likely to be the
enemy of the good.” It is almost surely true that,
in reality, as in Antinolfi, Azariadis, and Bullard’s
model, frictions prevent private markets—espe-
cially private credit markets—from operating with
total efficiency so as to bring equilibrium alloca-
tions in line with Pareto-optimal outcomes. Yet,
as Friedman emphasizes, it seems equally true
that, in reality, even the most carefully designed
government policies introduced into environ-
ments in which outcomes under laissez-faire are
clearly suboptimal have often made matters much
worse instead of much better. The inefficiencies
in private credit markets are usefully highlighted
in Antinolfi, Azariadis, and Bullard’s model. But,
before we lean too heavily on those inefficiencies
as the basis for justifying activist government
intervention in those same segments of the U.S.
economy, future research must more forcefully
establish that those inefficiencies are severe
enough, quantitatively, to also justify the risk
that a well-designed public policy will be poorly
implemented or will otherwise have unintended
and detrimental consequences. Many sad lessons
from history teach us that “reversion to autarky,”
in the vernacular as opposed to the language for
formal economic theory, most frequently occurs
precisely because of excessive government
involvement in private markets.
IS MONETARY POLICY REALLY
NECESSARY?
Although fiscal policy, in the form of a care-
fully designed system of income taxes and trans-
fers, might seem to be the most direct and effective
way of helping private agents in Antinolfi,
Azariadis, and Bullard’s model stabilize their con-
sumptions in the face of their fluctuating income
streams, the authors point out that the successful
implementation of such a policy requires the
government to obtain and exploit detailed infor-
mation about individual agents’ economic circum-
stances. On these grounds, they advocate the
search for monetary policy rules that help accom-
plish the same goal of income redistribution.
Along the same lines, however, one might
also note that the monetary policy rule that the
authors propose later, shown in their equation
(37), requires the central bank to adjust the rate
of money growth in response not just to move-
ments in the aggregate variable R, which measures
the real return to money (or the inverse of the
inflation rate), but also to the variable x, which
measures not aggregate income or consumption
but rather the share of aggregate consumption
enjoyed by high-income agents. In a more com-
plicated model with richer forms of heterogeneity,
the analog to the variable x would be a statistic
or set of statistics summarizing the cross-sectional
distribution of consumption. Successful imple-
mentation of this preferred monetary policy, there-
fore, also requires the government to collect and
process much of the same individual-specific
data needed to run an optimal tax-and-transfer
fiscal scheme.
For this reason, an alternative policy rule that
takes the form of the authors’ equation (38) and
therefore calls for a monetary response to changes
in the aggregate variable R alone may represent a
more appealing and realistic alternative to pure
laissez-faire or to a passive constant money growth
rate rule. In any case, working out the implications
of private information and the incentives that the
government can offer agents to truthfully reveal
that private information in settings like that
described by Antinolfi, Azariadis, and Bullard’s
model remains another important task for future
research; those implications may draw sharper
and more reliable distinctions between fiscal and
monetary policies as effective tools for income
redistribution.
IS TIME CONSISTENCY A
PROBLEM?
In Antinolfi, Azariadis, and Bullard’s model,
activist policy works to stabilize the economy
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expectations of future inflation under various
contingencies that arise both in and out of equi-
librium. As Kydland and Prescott (1977) empha-
size, however, public policymakers who make
announcements in an attempt to shape private
expectations often fall victim to the time-consis-
tency problem. Once private expectations based
on a policymaker’s announcements have been
built into private decisions, that same policy-
maker may have an incentive to deviate from his
or her promised action. The problem then arises
because private agents recognize that the policy-
maker has this incentive to renege on any initial
promise. In equilibrium, a policymaker without
the ability to commit strongly to a preannounced
policy may be unable to influence expectations
in the desired way.
All of Antinolfi, Azariadis, and Bullard’s
analysis proceeds under the assumption that the
central bank has this ability to commit. At the
same time, however, their model builds directly
and importantly on the idea that private agents’
inability to precommit to their own future actions
is precisely what provides room for welfare-
enhancing public policy in the first place. What
justifies this assumption that the government faces
no similar commitment problem? And if the
optimal activist monetary policy rules shown in
equations (37) and (38) turn out to be time incon-
sistent, how do optimal policies under discretion
compare with these counterparts under commit-
ment, both in terms of their implications for the
behavior of the money stock and inflation and in
terms of their ability to stabilize the economy
around the good steady state? These questions,
too, remain to be answered in future research.
IS CREDIBILITY A PROBLEM?
WHICH EQUILIBRIA ARE
EXPECTATIONALLY STABLE?
In addition to the time-consistency problem
described above, a second potential difficulty
may arise when the central bank tries to use the
optimal activist policies described by equations
(37) and (38) to stabilize the economy around its
good steady state: Once the economy reaches the
good steady state—immediately under (37) and
eventually under (38)—these activist policies call
for constant money growth and inflation rates and
may therefore appear to private agents as being
observationally equivalent to passive policies,
such as a constant money growth rate rule. Hence,
once the economy reaches the good steady state,
either of these activist policies retains its power
to stabilize the economy only through the effects
that the central bank’s commitment to the policy
rule has on private expectations of what would
happen, out of equilibrium, if the economy begins
to slip away from that good steady state.
Given the potential tenuousness of the expec-
tational forces keeping the economy in the good
steady state, even under an active monetary policy
rule, one might reasonably ask, What would hap-
pen if, instead of forming their expectations based
on how they believe the government would
behave out of equilibrium, private agents formed
their expectations based on how they actually
observe the government to behave in equilibrium?
Would the central bank have to act, periodically
at least, to maintain the credibility of its commit-
ment to the optimal rule?
Often, in the literature following Kydland
and Prescott (1977), “credibility” is used synony-
mously with “time consistency.” In this case,
however, the term as I use it refers to ideas that
are closer in spirit to the concepts of “expecta-
tional stability” and “learnability” that, in previ-
ous work, Bullard (2006) uses to characterize the
government’s ability to keep the economy in or
around a desired steady state when private agents
form their expectations adaptively, based on his-
torical data as opposed to full knowledge of the
economy’s true structure.
Examining the need and scope for activist
monetary policy to stabilize the economy
described by Antinolfi, Azariadis, and Bullard’s
model around the good steady state when expec-
tations are formed through adaptive learning
also remains an important and useful task for
future research.
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ROBUSTLY OPTIMAL?
This last question comes full circle, back to
Milton Friedman’s (1968) caveats about activist
public policymaking. Antinolfi, Azariadis, and
Bullard’s main result, concerning the optimality
of activist policy rules, seems quite sensible: If
the central bank wants to stabilize the economy
around a desirable steady state, then it certainly
stands to reason that its monetary policy ought
to react strongly whenever the economy begins
to deviate from that steady state. The authors’
main result shares the same powerful, intuitive
appeal as the Taylor principle from the literature
on New Keynesian economics.
However, their statement about robustness—
that, looking across many different macro-
economic models, optimal policy rules are all
activist—remains logically distinct from (and
therefore does not imply) another statement about
robustness: that any given activist policy rule,
fine-tuned to fit the special features of any given
model, will continue to work well across many
different macroeconomic models. Barnett and
He (2002) make this point quite forcefully, using
methods and arguments that are quite similar to
Antinolfi, Azariadis, and Bullard’s.
In this earlier paper, Barnett and He focus on
a macroeconomic model that is quite different
from the one studied here by Antinolfi, Azariadis,
and Bullard; specifically, Barnett and He work
with an older-style, medium-scale macroecono-
metric model developed originally by Bergstrom,
Nowman, and Wymer (1992). Nevertheless,
Barnett and He begin their analysis just as
Antinolfi, Azariadis, and Bullard do, by demon-
strating that, although the Bergstrom-Nowman-
Wymer model has an unstable steady state under
laissez-faire, it can be stabilized by an appropri-
ately designed activist fiscal policy rule. At the
same time, however, Barnett and He also show
that this activist fiscal policy rule, when properly
calibrated to stabilize the economy under a given
configuration of the model’s nonpolicy parameters,
works counterproductively to destabilize the
economy still further when improperly calibrated
to a slightly different set of nonpolicy parameters.
Barnett and He’s results thereby echo
Friedman’s caveat about the best being the enemy
of the good by confirming that an activist policy
that is fine-tuned to work well within one partic-
ular model may perform quite poorly when
applied to a very similar, but still slightly different,
economic environment. Barnett and He’s results
clearly indicate that additional careful and rigor-
ous analyses like Antinolfi, Azariadis, and
Bullard’s are needed to establish the robustness
of optimal activist fiscal and monetary policies.
CONCLUSION
Antinolfi, Azariadis, and Bullard’s conference
paper contributes to scientific knowledge in sev-
eral ways. It stands as the first paper to consider
the important distinction between active and
passive policy rules in a heterogeneous-agent
model with endogenously incomplete markets
that builds on Bewley’s (1980) and Townsend’s
(1980) early formulations. By considering this
distinction and by highlighting the stabilizing
powers of activist monetary policy rules, it also
draws useful and previously unnoticed links
between the branch of the literature in monetary
economics that studies the properties and impli-
cations of Bewley-Townsend-type models and
the until-now completely distinct branch of the
literature that studies New Keynesian models of
monopolistic competition and nominal price
rigidity. Finally, Antinolfi, Azariadis, and Bullard’s
paper contributes to scientific knowledge by rais-
ing a host of questions for future researchers who
share these authors’ technical sophistication, fine
attention to detail, and intellectual rigor.
Before closing, let me ask some of these ques-
tions again, phrasing them in a slightly different
way than they appear in my discussion above. The
optimal activist monetary policy characterized
by Antinolfi, Azariadis, and Bullard’s equation
(37) calls, in the authors’ own words (p. 340), for
the “money growth rate to drop by about 7 per-
centage points” in response to “each additional
1 percentage point of inflation.” Is this optimal
policy time consistent? Is this optimal policy
credible or expectationally stable? Is this optimal
Ireland
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environment? And is this optimal policy really
necessary? All of these questions await the same
type of careful and rigorous analysis contained
in Antinolfi, Azariadis, and Bullard’s very fine
conference paper.
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